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Abstract 
We analyse a different timing implementation of environmental regulation and compare the 
effects on the markets from a policy innovation perspective. The paper addresses the 
question: Should a regulator try to commit to a policy (ex-ante regulation) or rather adapt its 
policy to a firm's decisions (ex-post)? The findings are of interest towards improving 
regulatory effectiveness and economics efficiencies, e.g. for the transatlantic regional 
relationship between EU and USA. Our findings highlight differences in policy timing 
between markets may be harmful. The transatlantic regulators should consider the timing of 
the policy innovation for the achievement of mutual benefits. 
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Abstract
We analyse a different timing implementation of environmental
regulation and compare the effects on the markets from a policy in-
novation perspective. The paper addresses the question: Should a
regulator try to commit to a policy (ex-ante regulation) or rather
adapt its policy to a firm’s decisions (ex-post)? The findings are of
interest towards improving regulatory effectiveness and economics ef-
ficiencies, e.g. for the transatlantic regional relationship between EU
and USA. Our findings highlight differences in policy timing between
markets may be harmful. The transatlantic regulators should consider
the timing of the policy innovation for the achievement of mutual ben-
efits.
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1 Introduction
Environmental impact is a central priority concern of the advanced market
regulators, in their policy development and decision making (e.g. Hiriart et
al., 2004; Kolstad, et al., 1990; Innes and Bial, 2002; Puller, 2006). Economic
modelling attempts to account for externalities in optimising between alone
and combined ex-ante and ex-post regulatory effects. However, inefficiencies
such as disclosure of private information or negligence about the level of
harm, indicate a dynamic relationship between ex-ante / ex-post regulation
and firm / regulator (see for example Shavell, 1984).
In this spirit, a number of studies have been focus on the case of the ex-
post versus ex-ante (for some representative studies see Shavell, 1984; Kolstad
et al., 1990; Hiriart et al., 2004). Mainly these papers have focus on the case
where ex-ante regulation aims to regulate before the existence of possible
externalities (damages) and ex-post regulation aims to the correction of the
damage or possible externalities. They have introduced the threat of suit or
penalty in the ex-post case for the firms for the damage that they caused.
Moreover, these studies aim to to choose the less costly policy regulation
(Kolstad et al., 1990) and they conclude that a joint ex-post and ex-ante
policy is the most often case. Furthermore, the regulator’s decision is based
on the expected sum of the cost care and harm done (e.g. Shavell, 1984).
However, in our paper we compare the two policy timing cases and we focus
on the impact of each case on the level of the anti-pollution technology as
well as on the imperfect competition issue. Our paper contrary to Shavell
(1984) and Kolstad et al., (1990) explores a model where both regulator and
firms have perfect information and there is not uncertainty. Therefore, like in
Innes and Bial (2002) we assume a welfare maximising government where the
social welfare and the regulator’s decision is based on the consumer surplus,
producer surplus and the level of the environmental damage.
Much of the extant literature isolates the public policy effects to tech-
nological diffusion (Jaffe and Stavins, 1995) or narrow economic impacts of
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policy on firm productivity, labour and other fragmented growth factors as
performance (Berman and Bui, 2001). In reality, the decision to invest in
green anti-pollution technology emerges where regulator and firm have varied
market powers within imperfect competition, yielding mixed results for the
regulator, firm and environment (Shadbegian and Gray, 2006). Further, the
domestic market model and its competitive structures (Montero, 2002) im-
pact beyond borders (Tobey, 1990) where different governance models may
affect each other cross-nationally (Holzinger et al., 2008; Conyon et al., 2011).
Hence, the issue of environment needs to be understood as a complementary,
longer term and regional international regulatory issue (Goulder and Mathai,
2000; Flores et al., 2013) that practically affects diverse stakeholders (Free-
man et al., 2007).
Requate’s (2005a: 181:188) analysis of existing models and their features
notes limitations of policy instruments and concludes a gap in modelling for
ex-ante/ex-post timing of regulatory behaviour. The shortcoming is a lack of
attention to the output market ... ‘it is necessary to account for firm decision
on output’ (Requate, 2005a:193). Thus, the authors of this paper consider
both regulator and firm where, ‘...this basically boils down to the question
about who is the first to move, the regulator or firm?’ (Requate, 2005a:179).
The paper focus is from a regulatory perspective and contributes to a
gap in environmental policy research that focuses on modelling the timing
of decisions between the regulator (Governmental authority) and the firm
(Parry et al., 2003; Requate, 2005a). We address an interesting question:
Should a regulator commit to a policy (ex-ante) or rather adapt its policy
to a firm’s decisions (ex-post)? This is of particular importance in cases
of market power, where the timing of the regulatory decisions will alter a
firm’s strategic incentives. Particularly, the ex-ante regulation would allow
policy to lead market innovation in contrast with the ex-post regulation where
the regulator will allow firms to innovate and then he sets the regulatory
standards. In our modelling, we outline the monopoly and oligopoly case as
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important cases of market power (for similar approaches see Innes and Bial,
2002 and Puller, 2006) .Specifically we aim to analyse the economic effects
arising from the market power under the existence of negative externalities,
technological choice and alternative policy timing for which there is a gap in
the literature and which is important from a policy making perspective.
Our paper differs from previous studies with respect to the character-
istics of the model and to the way that the regulator could prioritize the
environmental protection in the political agenda. Specifically, we introduce
a weight in the social welfare equation which represents the priority that the
regulator could give to his political agenda in favour of the environmental
protection and against to the producer surplus (and vice versa). Also, we
assume decreasing returns to scale and a spectrum of possible technologies
available to the firms which (directly) are not connected with the level of the
production. Furthermore, we compare two different cases of market power
(monopoly and oligopoly) and we conclude that the market structure should
be taken into account by the regulator in order to design the timing of the
policy. Our results have implications for the timing of the policy regulation.
Timing of the policy is an important issue which has been analysed and
modelled from different perspectives (Van den Bergh, 2013; Bibas et al.
2015). Following these frameworks, we focus on the environmental anti-
pollution technology under the presence of regulator and firms. We analyse
two possible cases with respect to the timing of the decisions. In the first
case, ex-ante model, the regulator decides for the environmental technology
before the firm’s decision for the production level. Hence, the government
is committed to an environmental policy and sets the level of environmental
friendly technology. This describes the case where the regulator uses com-
mand and control policy as efficiency standards (e.g. emissions per unit of
output) that can only be met by a single and/or specific technology (for pol-
lution standards see for example Helfand, 1991) – as exemplified in recent
government policy towards U.K. diesel cars in major cities. In the second
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case, ex post model, the firm decides for the output and then the regulator
sets the level of the new anti-pollution technology. In such case, the firm is
innovative e.g. fracking for oil or industry emissions CO2 taxation; and the
government adopts a reactive quick response to issues of harm as negative
externalities in the market (see Denicolo, 1999 and Requate, 2005b).
By using a simple game theory model, we analyse how divergences be-
tween regulator / firm timing, when enforcing and/or implementing environ-
mental regulation, can impact on social welfare and firm economic strategy
and efficiency. The theoretical results highlight implications for market effi-
ciencies and environmental effectiveness. In consideration, our findings have
practical application to international trade treaties such as the transatlantic
regional relationship/negotiations between EU and USA where different pol-
icy timings are observed (e.g. Vogel, 2003). More recently, for the case of
U.K. Brexit negotiations with the European Union.
The game and its analysis can be summarized as: There is a social wel-
fare maximizing regulator who attaches a weight (or priority) to consumer
and producer surplus and therefore faces a trade-off between the benefits of
output production and its negative externality. The regulator’s weight on
each is exogenously given and not part of a broader political process. A firm
faces a demand for its product and decides its profit-maximizing output level
subject to (i) existing regulation (ex-ante scenario) or ii) expected regulation
(ex-post scenario). There is no uncertainty and the game is solved by back-
ward induction to find the SPNE. The analysis discusses comparative statics
and varies the market structure (monopoly, oligopoly).
Under the monopoly case, in the ex-ante case the regulator will incentivise
reduced environmental damage through policy. If the size of the market is
relatively large, the regulator will strongly prioritize environmental protec-
tion in order to achieve higher social welfare. Moreover, there is a U-shape
relation between the social welfare and the level of the weight/priority that
the regulator attaches to the surpluses. Hence, the regulator should strongly
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prioritize the environmental protection (and against to the producer surplus)
in the poltical agenda in order to reach higher social welfare. Additionally,
in the ex-ante case the anti-pollution technology is more environmentally
friendly but more expensive compared with the ex-post case. Furthermore,
firm will have lower profit but higher production level, compared with ex-
post case in which early adopter firm will have higher profit. An important
difference of the monopoly with the oligopoly market is that in the later mar-
ket the level of the damage parameter determines if the technology is more
or less environmental friendly under the ex-ante compared with the ex-post
regulation. In other words, the market structure is an important factor to
determine the regulator’s decision with respect to the timing of the policy.
The different timing of the policy for decisions may drive to economic asym-
metries within the firms in industry and between two countries/economies,
influencing loss of competitive power and reduction of the global (or common)
market share.
Simply, leading firms under the ex-post case will have greater ”benefits”
and gains rather than under the ex-ante case, which may be an important
reason for possible unstable and unsustainable policy agreement between
countries and in international firms partnerships or mergers.
From a regulatory policy perspective we argue that it is essential to crit-
ically examine the diversity effect of the policy timing in order to achieve
common policy effects between different countries/partnerships which may
better drive towards more sustainable win-win situations promoting common
and shared bilateral benefits.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: The proceeding
section analyses policy innovation diversity and the transatlantic regional
relationship between EU and USA. Next, the set up of the basic two-stage
model is explained as firm/regulator and solved for the monopoly case. The
comparison of the results is included before, robustness checking of the basic
model, with an extension i.e. the case of oligopolistic competition. Finally,
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the discussion and conclusion considers the regulatory perspective of policy
timing, whilst calling for further competitive industry level studies to support
our findings.
2 E.U. and U.S. Federal Relations
The transatlantic regional agreement/negotiations is used as an illustration
or example where the results from the theoretical model can be useful for
these type of international policy and economic agreements. Therefore,
this section includes the necessary information for the transatlantic rela-
tions which are helpful for the reader to understand the relation between the
theoretical model and the transatlantic regional relation.
The U.S. and Europe have direct investments of $3.7tn/ e2.8tn in each
other with bilateral trade amounting to $2.7m/e2.0m per day (High Level
Work Group, 2013). The Transatlantic economy, valued at $5tn, accounts
for forty percent of global G.D.P. by purchasing power; thirty percent of
world trade; and more than fourteen million interdependent jobs (Hamilton
and Quinlan, 2011). Most recently, official negotiations have resumed on the
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T.T.I.P.) which on comple-
tion will be the biggest trade deal in the history of the world. Most recently
a 15th round of negotiations took place during 3rd-7th October 2016 in New
York.
The current delicate global growth of 2.5% is led by Asia (United Na-
tions, 2012) whilst Europe and U.S. have stabilised from the shock of the
transatlantic crisis (van Essen et al. 2013). There has been an excessive re-
liance in recent decades on overleveraged financial markets (Kakabadse and
Kakabadse, 2012) in favour of the shareholder model (Friedman, 1962) which
is due a capitalistic rebalance in support of its wider stakeholders (Freeman
et al. 2007). The U.S. / European bilateral circumstance represents a call
for new multi-level business / socio- technological models (Flores et al. 2013;
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Onetti et al. 2012) and regulatory governance regimes (Conyon et al. 2011).
As this is not an isolated phenomenon, the crafting of innovative policies
and agendas is best understood by comparing and contrasting the federal
structures and stakeholders of these advanced regulatory regional economies
(Baldwin, 2011).
In this respect, scholars of comparative governance (van Essen et al. 2013;
Aguilera and Jackson, 2003) environmental and consumer regulation (Vogel,
2003); federal fiscal structures (Henning and Kessler, 2012); lobbying (Coen,
1999); corporate social responsibility (Matten and Moon, 2008); and even
organisational scandals (Soltani, 2013) debate the salient diversity / conver-
gence between the Continental European and neo-liberal Anglo-American
capitalistic models (Kakabadse et al. 2013). The notion of European inte-
gration and globalisation (Farazmand, 1999) are often differently understood
by national policy makers within the supranational entity of Europe (Hay
and Rosamond, 2002). Thus the need remains to harmonise multi-level di-
versity (Borzel and Risse, 2000) between society, institutions and businesses
(Shaffer, 1995) for mutual benefit and common good.
Our paper proceeds by engaging a policy innovation lens to compare and
contrast the U.S. and European markets and their stakeholders. Noting
cyclical irregularities, we focus attention on policy timing between regulator
(Government) and firms within each market across the regions. To achieve
balance as common good, there is a need to understand the diversity and
synchronise this so that policy outcome impacts can be mutually most effec-
tive. We engage a two stages game under two different scenarios to model
the behavioural conflict, co-operation and trade-offs between players at the
regional level. The emerging findings from our unique conceptualisation of
regulatory structures and stakeholders are used to make recommendations
that could harmonise or improve the diverse strategic interests of the players
across this transnational-transatlantic market.
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3 Two stage basic model: timing of the deci-
sion
As it was discussed in the above section, U.S / E.U. markets are shaped by
their regulator (Government) and the functioning of other stakeholders such
as firm. In this respect, the diversity of transatlantic regional relations fo-
cuses our attention on the difference in timing of regulatory decision. There-
fore in this section, we proceed with analysis of this using a two stage model
game with two cases. Our scenario posits that the regulator (Government)
has to decide for introducing new greener environmental technology in the
spirit of command and control environmental policy instruments.1 We intro-
duce a simple model with two strategic players: the firm and the government.
Two possible cases are considered with respect of the timing of the model.
In the ex-ante case the regulator moves first and sets the expected standard
(technology, quality, fines) for the best available environmental technology; a
command and control policy.2 Then, the firm decides for the level of output.
In the ex-post case the firm first decides for the output level. Then, the
regulator decides for the anti-pollution technology.3.
Ex-ante and ex-post scenario represent a different possible case of the
E.U. and U.S. regions (or some economic sectors) as described earlier. This
scenario posits that the regulator has to promote the adoption of a green
technology through policy decision-making mechanisms, e.g. RandD grants,
subsidies, legislative development. In modelling, change is captured either as
promotion (by regulator) or adoption (by firm) of green technologies.
In our model we assume that the firms will pollute the environment when
1A possible extension could be the case of the emission permits. For the case of envi-
ronmental taxes see Innes and Bial, 2002.
2For examples of innovation policy instruments see Borras and Edquist, (2013).
3A similar approach is followed by Khan et al., (2014) under an informal analysis and
for the case of the renewable energy in a monopoly market. In our case we focus on the
case of the environmental anti-pollution technology and we analyse a formal model under
monopoly and oligopoly markets.
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they produce goods. The quantity of pollution depends upon the level of
output (e.g. quantity of diesel fuel produced in a refinery) and efficiency
of the environmental technology (e.g. reduction of CO2 emissions). The
firm’s level of emissions is y = kq where y is the emissions (y > 0), k is the
technology and q the level of the production (q > 0). Contrary to Innes and
Bial (2002) we do not assume that the emissions fall with the improvement
of the environmental technology, neither increased. Technology k ∈ (0, 1]
is characterised within a spectrum of values ranging between 0 and 1. The
greener and less polluting the technology, the closer to 0 the value will be.
The more polluting the technological choice, the closer the value is to 1. The
absence of an ideal technology that eliminates all emissions is assumed (i.e.
we cannot take values equal to 0).4
The damage function (DF ) represents the damage to the environment,
DF = ey, where e (e > 0) is the damage parameter (e.g. the damage that
one tonne of CO2 will cause to the environment)
5.
Furthermore, it has been assumed that the players have perfect informa-
tion. We solve the model with backward induction in order to calculate the
Sub-game Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE).
3.1 The regulator
The regulator aims to maximize the social welfare (SW ) which is represented
in a simple form by the equation SW = CS + PS where CS is consumer
surplus and PS is producer surplus. Moreover, the regulator will set the
level of acceptable environmental technology or the best available environ-
mental technology k to maximize the SW . The regulator attaches a weight to
consumer surplus, producer surplus and negative externalities, This weight
is introduced in the model using the parameters (b, 1 − b). The parameter
4The set up of the technology is adopted from Asproudis and Gil Molto, 2014 and 2015.
5For similar damage function see Kennedy (1999), Kennedy and Laplante (1999) and
Requate (2005a).
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b represents the regulator’s level of interest or priority (in the regulator’s
agenda) for the environmental protection plus the CS and 1 − b represents
the priority for producer surplus. Hence, there is a trade - off between the
priorities for the two targets or simply the regulator could give more prior-
ity in favour to the PS (benefits of output production) but against to the
environment and CS and vice versa.6
Finally, the decision with respect to the environmental technology is
strongly connected with the damage that will happen to the environment
during the production process of the good. Therefore, the social welfare is:
SW = b(CS −DF ) + (1− b)PS (1)
where b ∈ (0, 1).
3.2 The firm
The firm’s target is to maximise the profits and is characterised by the cost
function
C = cq2 + (1− k)2 (2)
where c is the unit cost of q2 and (1− k)2 is the technological cost. Simply,
the greener the technology the lower the value of k, but the technology will
be more costly for the firm. In the opposite case, the higher the value of k the
more polluting the technology is, but the lower the adoption cost. Besides,
the quadratic version indicates the diminishing returns to investment for the
6The trade-off between the two (regulator’s) priorities is close to the reality and repre-
sents this case where one could be better off if someone else will be worst off. Furthermore
we assume b ∈ (0, 1), thus there are not extreme priorities.
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technology and decreasing returns to scale for the output.7,8
Additionally, the firm’s revenues are equal to pq where p is the price of
the good in the market and equal to the inverse demand function:
p = a− q (3)
with a (a > 0) the size of the market. Hence, the firm’s profits is given by
Π = pq − cq2 − (1− k)2 (4)
After the necessary calculations we take the results with respect to output,
technology, profits, prices, social welfare and emissions which are presented
in the table below9
Ex-Ante Ex-Post
q¯ a
2(1+c)
2a
4+4c+ b
2e2
(b−1)2
k¯ 1− abe
4(1−b)(1+c) 1− a(1−b)be4(b−1)2(1+c)+b2e2
Π¯
a2(1− b2e2
4(b−1)2(1+c) )
4(1+c)
a2(b−1)2
4(b−1)2(1+c)+b2e2
p¯ a− a
2(1+c)
a− 2a
4+4c+ b
2e2
(b−1)2
¯SW −aA+a
2b2e2
16(b−1)(1+c)2
a(b−1)2(X+Y )
(4(b−1)2(1+c)+b2e2)2
y¯ a(4(b−1)(1+c)+abe)
8(b−1)(1+c)2 2a(b− 1)2( 1L + a(b−1)beL2 )
7In our paper and contrary to Asproudis and Gil Molto (2015) we assume decreasing
returns to scale. The “Quadratic cost functions reflect decreasing returns to scale or
diseconomies of scale and are frequently met in applications, for instance in the modeling
of renewable resources exploitation” Dubiel-Teleszynski, T. (2011). Also the decreasing
returns to scale could represent the “limited supply of industrial land and buildings” like
in the case of Singapore’s manufacturing sector (Kee, 2002).
8Following Asproudis and Gil-Molto (2015), the technological cost is not connected
directly with the production level but with the anti-pollution technology. For example,
this could be the case of the number of the filters in the smokestack or the number of
catalysts in the cars (for similar cases see Keohane, 2002; Chao and Wilson, 1993 and
Srivastava et al., 2001).
9All the steps of the two models and the analogous calculations are available to the
reader and are included in the appendix.
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whereA = (b − 1)(2a(2c(b − 1) + b − 2) + 8b(1 + c)e), X = −8(b −
1)2b(1 + c) − 2b3e3, Y = a(b − 1)(−2(b − 1)(b − 2 + 2(b − 1)c) − 3b2e2)
andL = 4(b− 1)2(1 + c) + b2e2
3.3 Comparison
Since we have the results from the previous section we are in position to
calculate and characterise the differences of the two cases.
3.3.1 Price and output
After the calculation p1 − p2 < 0 (where the subscript 1, 2 represents the
ex-ante and ex-post scenario respectively) the result is negative, so the price
of the good in the second case is higher than in the first or the consumers
will pay more in the second scenario p1 < p2. Similarly, we calculate the
algebraic difference of the outputs/level of production (q1 − q2 > 0) where
the result is positive. So, in the first case where the regulator moves first the
firm will produce more than in the second case where the regulator moves
second.
Lemma 1 If the regulator moves first and decides the level of the environ-
mental technology (ex-ante), then the production rises and the consumers pay
less for the good than if the regulator moves second (ex-post).10
3.3.2 Technology and profits
We calculate the difference on the technologies’ values, k1−k2 < 0, hence the
firm in the second scenario will use more polluting technology. If the regulator
moves first and sets the technological level, then the firm will adopt a greener
technology than in the opposite case. However, adopting a greener technology
drives the firm to lower profits. Specifically, the analogous calculation for
10See the appendix for the proof of Lemma 1.
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the profits gives that the firm has more profits under the ex post scenario
(Π1−Π2 < 0) where the firm will move before setting the technological level
by the regulator than, under the ex-ante case.
Lemma 2 Under the ex-ante case the firm will adopt a less polluting tech-
nology but will achieve lower profit levels rather than under the ex-post case.11
From both Lemmas (1 and 2) we observe that; the firm will choose a
higher level of production in response to greener technology requirements
imposed ex-ante but this could drive to lower level of profits (than it could
be when the firm sets production level prior to learning of a less-green regu-
lation, ex-post). The explanation of these two results is based on the char-
acteristics of the firm and specifically on the decreasing returns to scale in
production. Hence, in this case the adoption of a better technology is not
necessary profitable for the firm or in other words the introduction of a new
technological level from the regulator may have a negative impact on the
specific - decreasing returns to scale - firm’s profits.
3.3.3 Emissions and environmental damage
With respect to the emissions we have that
y¯1 > y¯2 if a < acv (5)
y¯1 < y¯2 if a > acv (6)
where acv =
4(b−1)(1+c)[(−4(b−1)2(1+c)−b2e2)]
8(b−1)2b(1+c)e+b3e3 > 0 is a critical value with respect
to the market’s size. Hence, the results depend on the market size and there
are two effects behind this result. Specifically, under the ex-ante case the
firm will adopt less polluting technology compared with the ex-post case,
therefore the greener technology will drive to lower level of emissions (first
effect). However, under the ex-ante case the firm will produce more than
11See appendix for the proof of Lemma 2.
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under the ex-post case so, will pollute more (second effect). Thus, for a <acv
the second effect dominates the first but for a >acv the first effect dominates
the second (the decreasing of the emissions from the adoption of the greener
technology is more than the increasing of the emissions from the rising of the
production).
Since the environmental damage is equal to DF = ey, the results with
respect to the damage functions (DF1,DF2) are symmetrical with the emis-
sions (y1, y2) respectively and the critical value is the same. Therefore,
D¯F 1 > D¯F 2 for a < acv and D¯F 1 < D¯F 2 for a > acv.
Lemma 3 There is a critical value acv for the market’s size where i) for
a < acv the emissions (and the environmental damage) are more under the
ex-ante case ii) for a > acv the emissions (and the environmental damage)
are more under the ex-post case. Thus, for a relatively small market’s size
the damage to the environment is more if the regulator moves first and sets
the environmental technology level before the firm’s production.
3.3.4 Social Welfare
The social welfare depends on the market size. There is a critical market size
value which impacts the social welfare. Specifically,
¯SW 1 > ¯SW 2 if a > a
cv (7)
¯SW 1 < ¯SW 2 if a < a
cv (8)
where the acv = − 8(b−1)(1+c)e[(b−1)2(1+c)+b2e2]−16(b−1)3(1+c)+2(b−1)b(−6+5b+6(b−1)c)e2+b3e4 > 0.
Lemma 4 For relatively large size of the market (a > acv) the social welfare
is higher under the ex-ante case but for relatively small market’s size the
ex-post case drives to higher social welfare.
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3.4 Comparative Statics
In this section we use comparative statics to export and analyse the previous
results. Specifically, from the ex-ante scenario we focus on the technologi-
cal choice and we calculate the differentiation with respect to the parameter
b(∂k¯1
∂b
= − ae
4(b−1)2(1+c) < 0) where the result is negative. Hence, the higher
the value of the parameter b (more weight or priority), the greener, less pol-
luting the technology will be. This is not a surprising result since we expect
that a higher weight will drive the regulator to choose a greener technology.
However, what is interesting is the social welfare calculation with respect to
parameter b. Particularly,
∂ ¯SW 1
∂b
=
−a(K + a(b− 2)be2)
16(b− 1)2(1 + c)2 = 0 (9)
where K = (b−1)2(2a(1+2c)+8(1+c)e. We are solving with respect to the
parameter b and we get the critical value , bcv = 1− ae2√
ae2(8(1+c)e+a(2+4c+e2))
.12
The bcv determines if the social welfare is increasing or decreasing in the val-
ues of b. Notable, for b > bcv the
∂ ¯SW 1
∂b
> 0. The social welfare’s behaviour
with respect to weight b indicates that a U-Shape relation characterises the
SW with respect to the value of the parameter b. The intuition behind this
is the existence of two effects. Specifically, the increased value of parameter
b indicates that the regulator ‘strongly prioritises’ in the agenda the environ-
mental protection. However, the higher value of b is against profits. Thus,
the two effects are:
i) on the one hand the increasing of the parameter b drives to lower profit
level, mathematically ∂Π¯1
∂b
= a
2be2
8(b−1)3(1+c)2 < 0 since b < 1 (first effect)
ii) on the other hand, increasing the value of b drives to lower environ-
mental damage, mathematically ∂D¯F 1
∂b
= − a2e2
8(b−1)2(1+c)2 < 0 (second effect).
12We set ∂
¯SW 1
∂b = 0 and we solve with respect to b, Then, the quadratic form will give two
possible solutions. b1 = 1− ae2√
ae2(8(1+c)e+a(2+4c+e2))
and b2 = 1+
ae2√
ae2(8(1+c)e+a(2+4c+e2))
,
the second solutions is rejected because b < 1.
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That is, for b < bcv, the first effect dominates the second or the damage to
profits is larger than reducing the environmental damage and therefore the
SW decreases in b. However, for b > bcv, the second effect dominates the first
or the social welfare increases in b because the damage to the environment
reduces more than the damage to the firm’s profits.
Proposition 1 Under the ex-ante model, there is a U-shape
relation between the SW and the value of parameter b.
An interesting result is the relation between the technology and the out-
put in the ex-post scenario. Particularly, we use the implicit function theo-
rem based on the partial derivatives with respect to parameter b. Initially,
we calculate ∂q¯2
∂b
and ∂k¯2
∂b
where from the implicit function theorem we have:13
∂q¯2
∂b
∂k¯2
∂b
=
∂q¯2
∂k¯2
=
4(b− 1)be
−4(b− 1)2(1 + c) + b2e2 (10)
Solving with respect to the parameter e we get the critical value ecv =
−2(b−1)
√
1+c
b
.14 The damage parameter’s critical value determines if adopting
a greener technology will lead to an increase or decrease of the firm’s output.
Concretely, for e < ecv adopting a more polluting technology (higher the
value of k) will increase the production of the good ∂q¯2
∂k¯2
> 0. However, for
e > ecv the more polluting the technology, the less the level of the production
∂q¯2
∂k¯2
< 0. This is an interesting result for (both) the regulator (and the firm)
who will decide for the level of the technology after the firm’s decision for
the level of the output.
Proposition 2 Under the ex-post case there is a critical
value for the damage parameter ecv where;up to the critical value of ecv the
more polluting the technology, the larger the production of the good. However,
13 ∂q¯2
∂b =
4a(b−1)be2
(4(b−1)2(1+c)+b2e2)2 < 0, where numerator < 0 and denominator > 0, ∀b < 1 .
Also, ∂k¯2∂b =
−4a(b−1)2(1+c)e+ab2e3
(4(b−1)2(1+c)+b2e2)2 where denominator > 0 and numerator≶ 0, ∀b < 1.
14There are two possible solutions; e1 = − 2(b−1)
√
1+c
b accepted, e2 =
2(b−1)√1+c
b rejected∀e > 0.
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for the values of damage parameter bigger than the critical value, the more
polluting the technology, the less quantity of good the firm will produce.
4 Oligopolistic case
In this section for robustness, we extend the basic model (monopoly case)
in order to analyse the oligopolistic case. Although the extended model is
more complex and the results are characterised by closed form functions we
manage to extract some interesting results under the competition case. The
calculations for each stage are available on the appendix. Here, we present
the important results after the comparison of the two cases (ex-ante and
ex-post).
We focus on a duopoly market where the two firms i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j
compete on production level (Cournot) under a homogeneous product but
under assymetric cost ci 6= cj. The firms face an inverse demand function
pi = a− qi − qj and the firm i’s profits equals Πi = pqi − ciq2i − (1− ki)2.
4.1 Comparison
We compare the results (see appendix) from the previous two cases (ex-ante
and ex-post) under a Cournot duopoly competition. The comparison for the
case of the price, output, technology, emissions and environmental damage
is presented. The superscript EA indicates the ex-ante case and the EP the
ex-post case respectively.
Specifically, we calculate p¯EAi −p¯EPi = −2ab
2e2(2G2(1+2ci(1+ci)+2cj(1+cj))+b
2(1+ci+cj)e
2)
F (4G4F )+4G2b2(2+ci+cj)e2+b4e4
<
0 where G = b−1, F = 3+4cj+4ci(1+cj). The results are negative therefore,
as in the basic model, under the ex-post scenario the price of the goods is
more expensive than under the ex-ante scenario. Similarly, for the technolo-
gies k¯EAi − k¯EPi and after the necessary calculation we argue that there is a
critical value for the damage parameter ecv =
√
2
√
(b−1)2(−1+2ci−2cj(3+2cj)√
b2(1+2cj)
which
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determines the result from the comparison of the technologies15. Hence,
k¯EAi < k¯
EP
i if e > e
cv
k¯EAi > k¯
EP
i if e < e
cv
(11)
Furthermore, the specific critical value and for the comparison between
q¯EAi and q¯
EP
i we have
q¯EAi > q¯
EP
i if e > e
cv
q¯EAi < q¯
EP
i if e < e
cv
(12)
Proposition 3 If e > ecv then the technology is less polluting under
the ex-ante regulation and the firms produce more than under the ex-post. If
e < ecv the firms produce more under the ex-post but the technology is greener
than under the ex-ante regulation.
Analogous with the basic model are the results with respect to the emis-
sions and the environmental damage. Particularly, the difference y¯EAi − y¯EPi
(and DFEA−DFEP ) depends on the size of the market and the critical value
acv =
2GF (−4G4F−4G2b2(2+ci+cj)e2−b4e4)
8G4b(1+2cj)Fe+2G2b3(7+2cj(7+2cj)+ci(6+8cj))e3+b5(1+2cj)e5
> 0
y¯EAi > y¯
EP
i if a < a
cv
y¯EAi < y¯
EP
i if a > a
cv
(13)
Lemma 5 As in the basic model, the ex-ante case will drive to higher level
of emissions for relatively small market size ( a < acv) but the emissions are
greater under the ex-post case for relatively large market size ( a > acv).
5 Discussion and Conclusions
This paper contributes to a gap in environmental policy research that focuses
on modelling the timing of decisions between the regulator and the firm.
15In order to guarantee a real number for the ecv we set −1 + 2ci − 2cj(3 + 2cj) > 0 or
ci >
1
2 (1 + 6cj + 4c
2
j ).
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The question is: Should a regulator try to commit to a policy (ex-ante) or
rather adapt its policy to a firm’s decisions (ex-post)? Hence, by using a
simple game theory model, we explore how divergences in the timing when
implementing and/or enforcing environmental regulation can impact on the
social welfare and firms’ economic efficiency. The results are interesting from
a government and economic perspective. A possible application of the results
is the transatlantic regional relationship/negotiations between EU and USA
where different policy timing was observed with EU to follow an ex-ante
approach and USA an ex-post style of decisions (Vogel, 2003).
In the ex-ante model the regulator decides for the environmental technol-
ogy before the firms decision for the production level. In the ex post model
the firms decide for the output and then the regulator sets the level of the new
anti-pollution technology. Our theoretical findings are discussed below and
could have implications for international negotiations like the transatlantic
regional negotiations along with how innovations through national policies
and regional agreements can impact each other. The concept of this analysis
could indeed be applied and generalized to other government cases of policy
decision making where the timing of the policy innovation is crucial (e.g.
chemical sector, agriculture sector etc.).
We argue that, if the regulator commits to an environmental policy (ex-
ante) then environmental technology is more environmental friendly in com-
parison with the ex-post case. Specifically, under the ex-post regulation
the firm is incentivised to adopt the more polluting technology in favour of
higher profits. This, we relate to the U.S. market being corporate dominant
(Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2012) and incentivised commercially (Groll and
Ellis, 2013). Our findings may offer some insight into the E.U. (ex-ante) and
U.S. (ex-post) current dilemmas of policy. Importantly, this could explain
why diverse policy innovations persist and their effect needs resolution in
favour of a closer U.S.-E.U. relationship through the transatlantic regional
agreement/negotiations.
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For the ex-ante model we argue that the social welfare is higher if the
regulator will “strongly prioritize” the environmental protection in the polit-
ical agenda. In that case the technology is more environmental friendly and
there are two important effects. The firm’s profits will be reduced the less
polluting the technology is (effect one); but the damage to the environment is
also reducing (effect two). From the regulator’s view-point a sacrifice of the
profits’ in favour of environmental protection is worthy only if the weight or
the priority for the environmental protection is high in the political agenda.
However, we argue that if the priority is not relatively strong then this may
have a harmful impact on social welfare. We suggest this may explain the
E.U. over-regulatory impact (Schepers, 2010).
All in all, under a monopoly market, moving from an ex-ante to ex-post
regulation has the following consequences: i) the price increases while the
production decreases, ii) the environmental technology becomes more pol-
luting which leads to higher profits iii) the emissions and the environmental
damage either increase or decrease depending on the market size iv) a sim-
ilar threshold is introduced for the social welfare. However, in an oligopoly
market the damage parameter determines if the technology is more or less
environmentally friendly under the ex-ante regulation. This is important for
the regulator. The structure of the market could be an important factor to
influence the regulator’s decision with respect to the timing of the policy.
Specifically, under a relatively small level of damage parameter the technol-
ogy is more environmentally friendly and the production is larger under the
ex-post regulation rather than under the ex-ante.
Finally, we encourage further future research on the timing of the regula-
tion since each regulator that seeks to maximise social welfare is influenced
by the dynamics and incentives of institutional politics with organisational
circumstances, and to a lesser extent by other well-organised pressure groups
(Elliott et al., 1985; Grossman and Helpman, 1984). We note here that
N.G.O. influence has rising affect within European politics (Vogel, 2003) and
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that European consumers are targets of N.G.O’s due to their greater aware-
ness of issues (Spar and La Mure, 2003). The economic modelling of trade-
offs and protectionism as lobbying influences (Marusca and Irimies, 2013;
Bandyopadhyay et al., 2012; Weymouth, 2011; Barron, 2011; Holman, 2009;
Yackee and Yackee, 2006; Hillman, 2003; Damania and Fredricksson, 2000)
by interested parties (Magee, Brock and Young, 1989; Grossman and Help-
man, 1994; Bernheim and Whinston, 1986) at certain timings of the decision
making process, puts pressure on decision makers and could be an exten-
sion to our model under the same or different market structure (e.g.perfect
competitionor leader-follower model).
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6 Appendix
6.1 Ex-ante scenario - Monopoly
6.1.1 Stage 2: Firm decides on output
We calculate the First Order Conditions (FOC)16
∂Π1
∂q
= a− 2q(1 + c) = 0 (14)
and solving with respect to q the firm’s level of production and the analogous
profits are
q¯1 =
a
2(1 + c)
(15)
Π∗1 = q¯
2
1(1 + c)− (k − 1)2 (16)
where the subscript 1 indicates the first scenario (ex-ante).
6.1.2 Stage 1: Regulator decides for technology
After the substitution of (6) into (1) we have
SW ∗1 = (b− 1)[(k − 1)2 −
a2
4(1 + c)
] +
ab(a− 4(1 + c)ek)
8(1 + c)2
(17)
and from the FOC we obtain17
∂SW ∗1
∂k
= 2(b− 1)(k − 1)− abe
2(1 + c)
= 0 (18)
yielding the optimum technology
k¯1 = 1− abe
4(1− b)(1 + c) (19)
16The Second Order Conditions (SOC) are satisfied ∂
2Π
∂q2 = −2(1 + c) < 0.
17The SOC is ∂
2SW∗
∂k2 = 2(b− 1), which is negative since b < 1.
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where ∂k¯1
∂b
< 0 thus, the technological choice is reducing in b or the higher
the value of the parameter b the less polluting the technological choice k is.
We substitute all the results to the initial equations and therefore we have
the results for the ex-ante case. Particularly, the profits are given by
Π¯1 =
a2(1− b2e2
4(b−1)2(1+c))
4(1 + c)
(20)
and the price of good in the market is
p¯1 = a− a
2(1 + c)
(21)
After substituting the technology to the Social Welfare (8) we obtain:
¯SW 1 =
−aA + a2b2e2
16(b− 1)(1 + c)2 (22)
where A = (b− 1)(2a(2c(b− 1) + b− 2) + 8b(1 + c)e)
Also, the firm’s emissions are
y¯1 =
a(4(b− 1)(1 + c) + abe)
8(b− 1)(1 + c)2 (23)
where ∂y¯1
∂b
< 0 thus, emissions’ level is decreasing in b. Finally, the damage
to the environment is equal to D¯F 1 = ey¯1
24
6.2 Ex-post scenario - Monopoly
6.2.1 Stage 2: Regulator decides for technology
The regulator decides on the technological level in order to maximize the
social welfare. The FOC is equal to:18
∂SW
∂k
= 2(1− b)(1− k)− beq = 0 (24)
and solving with respect to k we have
k∗2 = 1−
beq
2(1− b) (25)
where the subscript 2 indicated the ex-post case.
6.2.2 Stage 1: Firm decides on output
After the substitution of k∗ into the profit’s equation we have Π2 = (a −
q)q − cq2 − b2e2q2
(2b−2)2 . As usual we calculate the FOC which is
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∂Π2
∂q
= a +
1
2
(−4− 4c− b
2e2
(b− 1)2 ) = 0 (26)
and solving for q we calculate the optimum level of output
q¯2 =
2a
4 + 4c + b
2e2
(b−1)2
(27)
We substitute q¯2 into k
∗
2 and then we have the optimum technology for this
model
k¯2 = 1− a(1− b)be
4(b− 1)2(1 + c) + b2e2 (28)
18The SOC is negative so, it guaranties the optimum value of k∗2 .
19The SOC is negative and equal to ∂
2Π2
∂q2 = −2− 2c− b
2e2
2(−1+b)2 .
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Hence, the final results for the ex post model are; profits equals
Π¯2 =
a2(b− 1)2
4(b− 1)2(1 + c) + b2e2 (29)
and price of the good is
p¯2 = a− 2a
4 + 4c + b
2e2
(b−1)2
(30)
After the necessary substitutions and calculation we get the Social welfare
¯SW 2 =
a(b− 1)2(X + Y )
(4(b− 1)2(1 + c) + b2e2)2 (31)
where X = −8(b − 1)2b(1 + c) − 2b3e3 and Y = a(b − 1)(−2(b − 1)(b − 2 +
2(b− 1)c)− 3b2e2).
The level of the emissions are given by
y¯2 = 2a(b− 1)2( 1
L
+
a(b− 1)be
L2
) (32)
where L = 4(b − 1)2(1 + c) + b2e2. So, the analogous damage function is
D¯F 2 = ey¯2.
6.3 Proof of Lemma 1
From the calculation of the difference we take p¯1−p¯2 = − ab2e22(1+c)(4(b−1)2(1+c)+b2e2
and it is straightforward that it is a negative result since the numerator and
the denominator is positive. Thus, the price is lower under the ex-ante case.
Also, we calculate q¯1 − q¯2 = ab2e22(1+c)(4(b−1)2(1+c)+b2e2 which is positive since
both numerator and denominator are positive.
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6.4 Proof of Lemma 2
We calculate k¯1 − k¯2 = ab3e34(b−1)(1+c)(4(b−1)2(1+c)+b2e2) where the denominator is
negative since b ∈ (0, 1), thus the technology is ”greener” or less polluting
under the ex-ante case.Furthermore, Π¯1−Π¯2 = − a2b4e416(b−1)2(1+c)2(4(b−1)2(1+c)+b2e2)
which is negative (both numerator and denominator are positive) since there
is a negative sing in front of the ratio. Hence, the level of the profitsis lower
under the ex-ante case.
6.5 Ex-ante scenario - Oligopoly
6.5.1 Stage 2: Firms decide on output
We calculate the First Order Conditions (FOCs)20 ∂Πi
∂q∗i
= a−2qi(1+ci)−qj = 0
and solving simultaneously with respect to qi we take
q¯EAi =
a(1 + 2cj)
3 + 4cj + 4ci(1 + cj)
(33)
ΠEAi = (q¯
EA
i )
2(1 + ci)− (ki − 1)2 (34)
where the superscript EA indicates the first scenario (ex-ante).
6.5.2 Stage 1: Regulator decides for technology
The Social Welfare is given by SWEA = b(CSEA − DFEA) + (1 − b)PSEA
where CSEA = 1
2
2∑
i=1q¯
EA
i , DF
EA = e(kiq¯
EA
i +kj q¯
EA
j ) and PS
EA =
2∑
i=1Π
EA
i
and from the FOC we obtain21
∂SWEA
∂ki
= 2(b− 1)(ki − 1)− b(a + 2acj)e
3 + 4cj + 4ci(1 + cj)
= 0 (35)
20The Second Order Condition (SOC) is satisfied ∂
2Πi
∂q2i
= −2(1 + ci) < 0.
21The SOC is ∂
2SW∗
∂k2 = 2(b− 1) < 0, ∀b < 1.
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yielding the optimum technology
k¯EAi = 1 +
ab(1 + 2cj)e
2(b− 1)(3 + 4cj + 4ci(1 + cj)) (36)
After the necessary substitutions the profits are
Π¯EAi = (q¯
EA
i )
2(
(
4(b− 1)2(1 + ci)− b2e2
4(b− 1)2
)
) (37)
and the price is
p¯EAi =
a(1 + 2ci)(1 + 2cj)
3 + 4cj + 4ci(1 + cj)
(38)
The emissions are given by y¯EAi = q¯
EA
i k¯
EA
i and DF
EA = ey¯EAi . As usual we
substitute the above equation into the SWEA and we take the final ¯SW
EA
.
6.6 Ex-post scenario
6.6.1 Stage 2: Regulator decides for technology - Oligopoly
Like in the basic model, the regulator will decide on the level of the technology
which maximises the social welfare. The FOC is equal to:22
∂SW
∂ki
= 2(b− 1)(ki − 1)− beqi = 0,
∂SW
∂kj
= 2(b− 1)(kj − 1)− beqj = 0, (39)
and solving simultaneously we have
kEPi = 1 +
beqi
2(b− 1) , k
EP
j = 1 +
beqj
2(b− 1) (40)
where the superscript EP indicates the ex-post case.
22The SOC is negative (2(b-1)) so, it guaranties the optimum value of k.
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6.6.2 Stage 1: Firms decide on output
After the substitution of kEPi into the profit’s equation we have Π
EP
i =
qi(a + (−1− ci − b2e24(b−1)2 )qi − qj) and the FOCs are23
∂ΠEPi
∂qi
= a + (−2− 2ci − b
2e2
(b− 1)2 )qi − qj = 0 (41)
where the optimum level of output is
q¯EPi =
4aG4(1 + 2cj) + 2aG
2b2e2
4G4F + 4G2b2(2 + ci + cj)e2 + b4e4
(42)
where G = b − 1, F = 3 + 4cj + 4ci(1 + cj). Moreover, the optimum level
of technology (after the substitution) equals k¯EPi =
2aG3b(1+2cj)e+aGb
3e3
4G4F+4G2b2(2+ci+cj)e2+b4e4
and similar we take the level of the emissions y¯EPi = q¯
EP
i k¯
EP
i , the damage
equation DFEP = ey¯EPi , the price p¯
EP
i = a− q¯EPi − q¯EPj , the profits ΠEPi =
q¯EPi (a+ (−1− ci− b
2e2
4(b−1)2 )q¯
EP
i − q¯EPj ) and the social welfare ¯SWEP (the last
results are characterised by complex and long equations).
23The SOC is ∂
2Πi
∂q2i
= −2− 2ci < 0.
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